Prof. Jeff McMahan, Oxford  1954-      https://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/people/jeff-mcmahan                        

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeff_McMahan_(philosopher)  He holds since 2014 the maybe most prestigious moral philosophy chair in academia, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sekyra_and_White%27s_Professorship_of_Moral_Philosophy

The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780195079982.do

Reviews: Australasian Journal of Philosophy by Agar, Australian Review of Public Affairs by West, Canadian Journal of Philosophy -  best 18 pages review! By Mulgan,  Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie by Leist, Ethics by Marquis, Journal of Ethics - review essay by Holtug, Journal of the American Academy of Religion by Flescher , London Review of Books by Mulhall, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews by Lacewing,  Philosophical Books 1, Philosophical Books 2, Philosophical Books 3, Philosophical Review by Kamm!, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research - review essay by McKerlie, Philosophy and Public Affairs - review essay byDeGrazia , Ratio by Lang Sats – Nordic Journal of Philosophy by Lippert-Rasmussen, Times Literary Supplement  by Mulhall, Utilitas by Athanassoulis

"The thoroughness and comprehensiveness with which he [McMahan] has worked out these ideas is deeply impressive. The presentation is throughout so lucid that non-specialists should be able to profit greatly from the book ... There could be no better proof of the vitality of the subject of death and killing than this monumental book." - Ingmar Persson, Times Literary Supplement.

 

Reviewed Item: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing. Oxford, OUP.

McMahan, Jeff 2005. Book Symposium about McMahan, Jeff 2002 The Ethics of Killing;  On Harming and Killing: Replies to Hanser, Persson and Savulescu, and Wasserman. Philosophical Books 46 (1): 1-3 & 34-44. Page3 “I argue that we are neither incorporeal souls nor human organisms.
If I am not a soul, I cannot exist without being physically embodied. But if I am not identical with this organism, it is possible that I began to exist after it did and may cease to exist before it does, or indeed before it dies. I argue that this is in fact the case:  that we are embodied minds that begin to exist when the foetal brain develops the capacity to support consciousness, which occurs sometime between 22 and 30 weeks after conception. We continue to exist as long as those areas of the brain in which consciousness is realised retain the capacity for consciousness. When that capacity is irreversibly lost, we cease to exist. If this is right, abortions performed prior to 22 weeks (which constitute the vast majority of abortions) do not kill someone like you or me but instead prevent one of us from existing. What they kill is merely an unoccupied human organism that has neither interests nor rights.
These abortions are therefore morally comparable to contraception.”

Agar, Nicholas 2003. Reviewed Item: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing. Oxford, OUP. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3): 445-447.

Coope, Christopher M. 2006. Death Sentences. (Review Essay about McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing). Philosophy 81 (315): 5-32.

Athanassoulis, Nafsika 2005. Reviewed Item: McMahan, Jeff 2002 The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. Utilitas 17 (1): 117-119.

Elstein, Daniel J. 2005. The Asymmetry of Creating and Not Creating Life. Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (1): 49-59.

Flescher, Andrew M. 2003. Reviewed Item: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 71 (4): 959-961.

Hanser, Matthew 2005. Book Symposium: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing; Where's the Harm in Dying? Philosophical Books 46 (1): 4-10.

Holtug, Nils 2011. Killing and the Time-relative Interest Account. Journal of Ethics 15: 169–189.

Kamm, Frances M. 2007. Reviewed Item: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing. Philosophical Review 116: 273-280.

Kumar, Rahul 2008. Permissible killing and the irrelevance of being human. Reviewed Item: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing. Oxford, OUP. Journal of Ethics 12 (1): 57-80.

Lacewing, Michael 2002. Reviewed Item: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 1: https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23055-the-ethics-of-killing-problems-at-the-margins-of-life/

Lang, Gerald 2005. Reviewed Item: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing. Oxford, OUP. Ratio 18 (3): 365-369.

Leist, Anton 2002. Frühes menschliches Leben zwischen Interesse und Identität. Besprechung: Jeff McMahan 2002 The Ethics of Killing. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 49 (6): 993-997.

Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper 2002. Reviewed Item: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing. Oxford, OUP. SATS: Nordic Journal of Philosophy 3 (2): 154-158.

Marquis, Donald 2003. Reviewed Item: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing. Oxford, OUP. Ethics 113 (2): 437-440.

McKerlie, Dennis 2005. Reviewed Item: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2): 477-490.

Mulgan, Tim 2004. Critical Notice of 'The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life' by Jeff McMahan. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3): 443-460. (Bester 18! Seiten Review!)

Mulhall, Stephen 2002. Reviewed Item: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing. London Review of Books 24 (16): 16-18.

 

Persson, Ingmar 2002 Reviewed Item: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing. Oxford. OUP. Times Literary Supplement.

 

Persson, Ingmar / Savulescu, Julian 2005. Book Symposium: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing; McMahan on the withdrawing of life-prolonging aid. Philosophical Books 46 (1): 11-22.

Spitzley, Thomas 1998. McMahan on Psychological Continuity and the Value of Future Goods. In. Fehige, Christoph / Wessels, Ulla (eds.). Preferences (Perspektiven der Analytischen Philosophie. Band 19). Berlin, De Gruyter: 503-507.

Stretton, Dean 2004. The Deprivation Argument Against Abortion. Bioethics 18: 144-180 Page 144: “… they ignore the role of psychological connectedness in determining the magnitude or seriousness of deprivation-based harms: because the foetus is only weakly psychologically connected to its own future, it cannot be seriously harmed by being deprived of that future.”.

Wasserman, David 2005. Book Symposium: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing; Prenatal Harm and Preemptive Abortion in a Two-Tiered Morality. Philosophical Books 40 (1): 23-33.

West, Caroline 2004. Reviewed Item: McMahan, Jeff 2002. The Ethics of Killing. Australian Review of Public Affairs (http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2004/05/west.html) .