Neo-speciesism

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Speciesists believe that membership in a particular species is morally relevant. Morally relevant properties entitle their possessors to have their interests considered preferentially relative to those individuals who lack that property. Those dispensing consideration incur obligations or, minimally, options, to act with bias. As a matter of fact, all known speciesists are human speciesists, not in the sense that only humans—and not tigers and cows—believe that species is a morally relevant attribute, but in the respect that they believe that human interests ought to be favored over the like interests of members of other species.

We can distinguish between absolute and indexical speciesists. Absolutists believe that human interests ought to be preferentially considered by any individual capable of giving special treatment. So if lions or Martians have this capability then, if a relevant situation presents itself, the lion and tiger ought to prioritize the interests of humans over the interests of the members of their own or any other species. If an absolute human speciesist were asked who ought to favor the interests of humans, her answer would be “every individual who can.” Indexicalists believe that the obligations of preferred treatment attach only to the members of that species; the property “being a member of species S” determines not only who ought to be favored but also who ought to do the favoring. So if lions can dispense special treatment then, in a relevant circumstance the lion ought to favor a lion over the like interests of both humans and Martians. Similarly, Martians owe “their own” preferential concern. If an indexical human speciesist were asked who ought to favor the interests of humans, her answer would be “only other able humans.”

Armed with this distinction and adamantly claiming allegiance to indexicality, some speciesists now think that their partialism is blessed by morality. Since members of any species are permitted to extend special concern to their fellow species’ members, indexical speciesists view their partialism as fairly administered. But, there is less here than meets the eye. We can grant the indexical partialist “fair” appropriation of his partialism where this is tantamount to universal dispensation. But universalization of partial behavior does not make impartial morality. Consider the ethical egoist who universalizes his racism by suggesting that everyone (including himself) should mistreat anyone (including himself) who is African-American. Or reflect upon the indexical negative speciesist who believes that members of a species ought to treat the interests of their co-members with less consideration than the like interests of members of other species. A reasonable inquiry would be to ask this admittedly eccentric person why he holds this view calling for...
disparate treatment. Equally reasonable would be a request of the typical indexical speciesist who speaks of local favoring; we still want to know his warrant for selecting species as morally demarcating. Presumably in the case of both speciesists, an answer to our question would suggest why the consideration toward our own should be negative or positive, respectively. Indexical or not, speciesists owe us a reason why we ought to break with impartial morality along species lines. It is the justice, not fairness, of speciesism that occupies us.

I

For virtually all of the last two thousand years, human speciesism has been defended by selecting certain inherent qualities purportedly shared by all and only humans. Aristotle focused on rationality, Descartes on linguistic ability, and theologians on ensoulment. No natural property seems to turn the trick. They fail on three counts. First, it is simply untrue that all humans have any of these allegedly morally relevant properties; we need only consider the so-called marginal humans, those who suffer from debilitating mental disorders. Second, it is simply untrue that no nonhumans have these qualities. By any nontechnical definition, some animals can think and some can use language. Third, and most important, it is scarcely transparent why rationality, linguistic ability, or any other natural property enhances the significance of an individual’s interests. Undoubtedly different interests result, but even assuming commensurability, a compelling argument is needed to show why the interests of the rationally and linguistically gifted are more significant than those who are challenged.

Ensoulment evades these problems. Scripture, suitably interpreted, tells us that all and only humans have souls and this wondrous attribute makes our interests uniquely special. The force of this suggestion obviously requires accepting a great deal of a particular theology understood in a highly contentious way. Philosophers have been rightly wary of placing too much weight on divine guidance in this area.

Although some speciesists continue to appeal to these and other inherent human qualities for justification, a recent trend takes the argument in a different direction. Neo-speciesists claim that there are relational properties that obtain only among human beings and ground the privileging of our interests over those of other species. The relational properties most prominently anointed with this special moral power are loyalty and solidarity.

II

Loyalties are paradigmatically manifested in flourishing friendships and families. Requiring personal interaction over a period of time, future friends will discover or develop common commitments, ideals, and perspectives on life. Mutual attachments are formed. Friends have a greater level of comfort and trust with each other than with strangers or mere acquaintances and so more intimate details about each person’s life typically get shared. Part and parcel of being friends is the inclination to privilege each other’s interests over
the like interests of outsiders; a healthy friendship demands partiality. In the absence of loyalty, friendships are breached and devolve into shams.

Family loyalties likewise proceed over time in predictable ways. Mothers and fathers tell their children about their own history, and so, simultaneously, about the children’s. Ideas are exchanged over dinner. Values and goals become discussed and imparted, explicitly or implicitly, during a period of many years. Mutual affection, appreciation, and love thrive. It is no surprise that family and friend environs are the homes for the fiercest loyalties.

Consider the lifeboat case where you are safely sailing in a boat and find two flailing swimmers in the middle of the ocean. One is your friend, the other a stranger. If only one can be saved, loyalty to your friend justifies saving him over the other. In this circumstance, you need not abide by the dictates of impartial morality by, say, flipping a coin to decide whom to save. In fact, it may be reasonably argued that the loyalty of the friendship obligates you to save your friend at the expense of the stranger; flipping a coin is not merely unnecessary but wrong.

Loyalty appeals are legitimate not only to tip the scales in an otherwise balanced situation but also to reverse some decisions made purely on impartial grounds. Your friend needs a ride to the grocery store while an acquaintance needs a ride to the dentist for his annual checkup. Loyalty permits, if not requires, giving preference to your friend. Of course there are limits to loyalty’s moral power. If a friend needs a ride to the grocery store and the acquaintance requires immediate attention for a complex fracture, impartial consideration of interests holds sway.

Buoyed with these concessions about loyalty, the speciesist argues by analogy. Just as loyalty legitimizes, if not obligates, privileging the interests of friends over the like interests of acquaintances or strangers, so too, loyalty permits, if not requires, privileging the interests of members of our species over the interests of members of foreign species.

We cannot, of course, conveniently forget that part of the analogy that constrains the use of loyalty appeals. Loyalty does not confer a moral carte blanche and so when the interests of another species are significantly greater than those of a human, impartiality rules. This leaves plenty of space to discuss whether, in any particular case, the interests are significantly different to frustrate loyalty appeals, but by any honest reckoning the almost unimaginable suffering that animals experience on factory farms far outweighs the gustatory delights provided by carnivorism. Hunting faces the same huge disparity of significant interests and, although this is not the venue for debate, I believe vivisection, as well, cannot be saved by appeal to loyalty. Nevertheless, these practical considerations do not challenge the adequacy of the analogy and the propriety of appealing to loyalty as grounds for privileging the interests of humans.

III

We can think of loyalties as dispositions “to commit oneself to and identify with the goals of some particular individuals, institutions, or groups.” How does this account, best exemplified in friendship and family relation-
ships, apply to our putative loyalty to *Homo sapiens*? Each of us knows perhaps 0.00001% of the group. I, for one, have not exchanged ideas with any Tutus recently, and my guess is that I speak for most of us. There is more mutual affection between my dog Boomer and myself than there is between me and any of the 1.3 billion people in China. In short, the conditions necessary for developing loyalties with individuals are missing. Neo-speciesists are on firmer ground when they reference shared values, goals, and aspirations that individuals have to humans, not individually, but collectively. They can plausibly advance the thesis that a great many people share and cultivate the survival and flourishing of our species, a view supported by the fact that many of us expend enormous efforts to limit the spread of disease and reduce starvation throughout the globe. Although few of us visit sub-Saharan Africa or poverty-stricken villages in Bangladesh, we contribute time and money to relief networks that serve as distribution centers for medical and agricultural supplies.

Although I maintain misgivings about the existence of species loyalty, let us accept its reality. Let us also bracket the aforementioned fact that loyalty appeals generate justifications only when the interests of the parties are roughly of the same quantity and quality. Of greater theoretical importance is the fact that the logic of the lifeboat cases used to demonstrate the legitimacy of loyalty appeals cannot be transported to our institutional relationships with animals. Granted, loyalty justifies saving your friend over a stranger; in what we may call type 1 lifeboat cases; comparable harms would befall both parties had you done nothing. But if your friend needs a heart transplant to survive and some innocent stranger uniquely has the right fit, you cannot appeal to loyalty to justify murdering the stranger so that your friend can live. In these kinds of cases, what we may call type 2 lifeboat cases, comparable harms are exchanged in a particular action, where the harm of one party is created by the exchange.

None of our institutional relationships with animals resemble the first type of lifeboat case and precious few are analogous to the second. It is not as though we find fellow humans in factory farms with cows and chickens or find them in hunting fields with deer and doves and must decide which species to extricate from their life-threatening surroundings. At the outermost fringe of possibility, we may envision a case of vivisection instantiating the second kind of lifeboat situation, where Phil will die unless he immediately receives a heart valve. A healthy pig is available with just the right part. If loyalty appeals could be used to justify actions in which comparable harms are exchanged where the harm to one participant is created by the exchange, the speciesist may begin to have an argument in these extreme vivisectionist cases. But loyalty appeals are not legitimate in these types of lifeboat cases and so cannot support even these highly stylized vivisectionist scenarios.

Am I being too hasty? Jennifer Welchman believes that there are examples of type 2 lifeboat cases that are amenable to loyalty appeals.

(Drowning) Sally, the innocent stranger, is in a lifeboat. Mary and her mother are flailing in the water. Mary’s mother can only save her daughter by dislodging Sally, in which case Sally would drown.
Given that the situation is an extreme emergency and only one life can be saved, Welchman believes that Mary’s claim to her mother’s loyalty gives her mother moral cover to save her daughter. It is of no great moment that my intuition differs; fortunately, we can progress beyond posturing.

Welchman rhetorically asks whether “it is obvious that Sally’s prior possession of the lifeboat gives Mary’s mother a better reason for letting her daughter drown than loyalty gives for ejecting Sally?” We should be fully cognizant that in Drowning, Sally’s “prior possession of the lifeboat” is tantamount to the actual, independent possession of her life. Consider:

(Blood) Rebecca’s sister Heather desperately requires a blood transfusion. A healthy, innocent Regina uniquely has the blood type needed to save Heather. Rebecca can save Heather but only at the expense of Regina’s life.

Drowning and Blood are structurally similar and should evoke the same intuitions and the same considered moral judgments. If Welchman were to ask whether it is obvious that Regina’s actual, independent life gives Rebecca a better reason for allowing her sister to die than loyalty gives for transfusing (and thus killing) Regina, I would unhesitatingly answer in the affirmative.

It is difficult to imagine that the commitment and identification to the goals of any other individual, group, or institution could be greater than the commitment to one’s own aims. Presumably, the most pristine kind of loyalty would be self-loyalty. Consider:

(Self) Phil needs a heart transplant immediately to survive. Frank, an innocent, fortuitously happens by with just the perfect heart for Phil to survive. Phil can effect the operation that would result in his continued life but in Frank’s death.

I assume that Phil’s appeal to loyalty would do little to assuage our sense of moral outrage. We can empathize with him, understand how he would be motivated by the desire to continue living, and may even admit that if we were in his situation, we would act similarly. We may even be willing to consider this situation so extreme as to mitigate our blame and censure. Nevertheless, I submit that we think that Phil’s appeal to loyalty does nothing to justify his action; the appeal does not change the fact that Phil acted wrongly when he caused Frank’s death.

There is an inclination to dismiss self-loyalty—and so discount the intuitive power of Self—as verbal chicanery; self-loyalty is not a type of loyalty at all but just disguised egoism. This is a temptation that we should resist. Clearly, self-loyalty differs from egoism when conceived as a normative ethical theory for the very simple reason that self-loyalty is not a theory, let alone a normative ethical one. We also need to distinguish self-loyalty from egoism when the latter is interpreted as a psychological hypothesis that claims that intentional actions are universally generated out of regard for an agent’s self-interests. Phil is not motivated by the belief that the operation is in his best interests (though they may well be), but rather is moved to act
because he believes that he "owes it to himself" to satisfy those goals with which he, naturally, so strongly identifies. These goals need not include maximizing his self-interests or even his continued existence, but they do require that Phil survive. Unfortunately for Frank, Frank's life stands in the way. There is no obstacle, then, in viewing Self as a piece with Drowning and Blood and therefore the same moral judgment should prevail in all three cases. Though admittedly not a conclusive argument, this provides strong evidence that, pace Welchman, loyalty appeals lack force in type 2 lifeboat cases.

Finally, species loyalty cannot be legitimately used to preferentially treat human interests on pain of proving too much. Although classification by species is under serious attack, species are usually distinguished either by DNA structure or interbreeding populations. As in the cases of loyalties to one's race and sex, co-membership is not a product of any intentional acts that might ground special preferencing of interests. As we rightfully decry loyalties to one's race and sex as euphemisms for the bigotries of racism and sexism, we should extend our negative attitudes toward those who forward species loyalty as justification for preferential consideration.

IV

Perhaps where loyalty fails as a justification for speciesism, solidarity will succeed. Appeals to solidarity are based on the "recognition that certain moral and social protections shared by the members of another social group will not be extended to members of one's own, so that if help is to be found anywhere it will be found only within one's own group."11 Appeals to solidarity respond to the fact that there is a "they" against "us" and that it is we alone who will defend our claims to basic rights and satisfaction of our fundamental interests.

The paradigmatic analogies no longer take the form of family or friend relationships. Instead, we are to think of oppressed groups who can justify preferential consideration to their own by referring to the fact that their most basic interests, including perhaps their very existence, require favoritism. It is on these grounds that an aboriginal could, with moral propriety, earmark his kidney to solely another aboriginal, or that a black man (especially in the early nineteenth century) could limit blood transfusions to other black people, or that a woman in a sexually oppressive society could demand that only other women be allowed in her grocery store. In these cases, the ubiquitous fear of being charged with bigotry akin to racism or sexism is obviated. The fact that the "other" is (perceived as) a threat to an individual and that the only aid will come from your own, serves as justifying favoring the interests of one's group.

One objection to the loyalty attempt is immediately nullified. No longer do we need actual contact or conversation with our fellow humans, as we did when we thought of loyalty as a relationship between individuals. However, in the typical cases of solidarity, where fundamental rights and basic liberties are denied by oppressors, the comparison with animals is otiose; to characterize humans as dominated by animals is to reverse reality. Animals do not frustrate the satisfaction of our interests; at most, they will not, because they
cannot, help us in our quest to fulfill them. We need, then, an argument that solidarity appeals can be efficacious against an innocent group in the name of self-defense.

I introduce Jan, a Japanese internee of World War II who spent several years in confinement and Ida, an Inuit, who was also interned because she was mistakenly thought to be Japanese.\textsuperscript{12} We imagine Jan and Ida never previously meeting or sharing conversations. Moreover, we stipulate that their backgrounds differ so widely that their goals, values, and aspirations have virtually no overlap. Although ineligible for a loyalty relationship, they are prime candidates for sharing a solidarity relationship. Finally, let us add innocent Sarah to the mix and discuss two cases.

(A) Jan is in the lifeboat. She finds Ida and Sarah flailing in the water drowning. Jan can only save one.

Solidarity justifies Jan’s decision to save Ida. There is nothing especially problematic about this since this is a paradigmatic type 1 lifeboat situation.

(B) Sarah and Jan are in the lifeboat. They see Ida flailing about in the ocean. Only two people can survive in the boat.

Can the claim of solidarity justify Jan in pushing Sarah off the boat and thereby killing her so that she can save Ida? At first blush, this looks perfectly analogous to the type 2 lifeboat situations with appeals of loyalty being used to justify biased behavior. But we must remember that only those individuals with whom one has a solidarity relationship can be expected to help you obtain the fundamental social and moral protections. So Jan can reasonably expect to receive help from Ida and not Sarah; only by killing Sarah can Jan reasonably expect to see improved chances of gaining fundamental rights. On the other hand, it needs to be emphasized that neither Sarah as an individual, nor the group of which she is a member, has played an active role in the oppression suffered by Jan and Ida, nor is Sarah a threat to Jan. Finally, to alleviate complications regarding obligations to assist those in need, it should be assumed that Sarah is not in a position to help the group of which Jan and Ida are members.

It seems to me that an appeal to solidarity is illegitimate. To see this, consider a case structurally similar to Self but where solidarity rather than loyalty plays the operable relationship.

(S) Moses is the lone Jew in a small German town in 1942 when anti-Semitism is at its peak. A well-armed Swede fortuitously walks by Moses’ house. If, but only if, Moses kills the Swede will he gain access to the guns that he needs to have a reasonable expectation of escape from the German village.

Moses can only turn to himself for help; in all likelihood, his very existence depends upon him taking the innocent Swede’s life. Yet, surely Moses cannot legitimize his murdering the Swede by appealing to self-solidarity. As with
Phil in Self, we can empathize with Moses’ plight and even concede that if we were in his situation we very well might kill the Swede to survive. Nevertheless, Moses’ action transcends the limits of what we can morally do in the name of self-defense.

It is worth noting that the appeal to solidarity is even less convincing when it is used to justify speciesist practices regarding animals. In (B) and (S), we had the innocents Ida and the Swede fortuitously entering our lifeboat cases. Animals, on the other hand, are coerced by us into lifeboat situations; cows, chickens, and pigs do not just happen to roam into a factory farm nor do mice, dogs, and cats casually saunter into vivisectionist laboratories. Animals are in the position they are not because of poor reasoning or even bad luck, but because we intentionally and deliberately place them there without their consent.

Does this coercion matter? Consider (B) again but with the addition that Sarah is kidnapped by Jan to be a hostage, or return to (S) now modified so that the arrival of the innocent Swede is a result of a deceitful letter from Moses telling the Swede that his wife is being held hostage by the Nazis in the German village. If there is a change in moral judgment, it is that Jan’s throwing Sarah from the boat or Moses’ killing the Swede become more despicable. History matters; how lifeboat situations are generated is morally relevant and so whatever moral residue appeals to solidarity may have in the unadorned intrahuman cases disappears when we realize how animals, in fact, become unfortunate innocents.

And, finally, it is difficult to see how neo-speciesists, who use solidarity as a defense of the preferential consideration of the interests of humans can justify ‘humanity’ as their favored group. It is true that help can come only from humans but it is also true that help can come only from the animal kingdom. While it is unlikely that Boomer will help me recover some social protections, it is equally unlikely that an Australian aboriginal will bring any comfort. I find myself, as a Jew whose ancestors were continually oppressed, more like Boomer (in this way, at least) than, say, the royal family in Great Britain. If the Japanese and the Inuit can have a solidarity relationship that allows them to inflict harm on the innocent Egyptian, I see no reason why such a relationship cannot exist between a human and a dog that permits, under certain circumstances, bringing about pain and death to other humans.

V

In claiming that appeals to loyalty and solidarity carry no weight in type 2 lifeboat cases, I am claiming that, ordinarily, appeals to these relationships cannot legitimize harming innocents to spare others of comparable evils. While this denies neither that loyalty nor solidarity appeals have force in some contexts (indeed, for the sake of discussion I have assumed that they do) nor that type 2 cases can be justified by other appeals (as, no doubt, they certainly can be), one may argue that in cases like (Blood), (B) and (S) no justification is necessary.

In (B), for example, one innocent person will die whether Jan pushes Sarah off the boat or not. If we are given no historical context in which to
understand this situation, the only reason for believing that Jan is not permitted to dislodge Sarah and save Ida must be that Sarah already has her place of safety on the boat. It seems, then, that I am using the fact that Sarah is already on the boat to justify preferentially considering her interests over the like interests of Ida. Assume that the respective positions of Sarah and Ida are independent of merit or desert, that they result from a random drawing in which Ida just as easily could have occupied Sarah’s place of safety. Under these background conditions, what, if anything, legitimizes this favoritism? Some thinkers, so-called entitlement theorists, would analogize Sarah’s favorable position to that of someone who receives a gift. Although the recipient of a gift may have done nothing to merit or deserve it, she alone is entitled to it, where “being entitled” is a morally robust notion as “having merited,” having the import, roughly, of “deserving without having earned.” There are obvious differences between Sarah in (B) and the gift recipient. Giving gifts is an activity embedded in a rich social structure where almost invariably gifts are intentionally given to a specific individual or group. To put it mildly, we do “feel more comfortable . . . if most of the transfers under it (the entitlement system) are done for reasons.” This, however, does not denude the analogy. We can think of the recipient of the gift being chosen randomly, selected, say, by the slot in which a tossed pellet lands in a revolving roulette wheel. Now both Sarah and the gift recipient have their favorable positions determined by luck or chance.

Nevertheless, qualms persist. Since, unlike Sarah’s fateful circumstance, the activity of gift giving is essentially a social and cultural product, it is virtually analytic to view recipients as entitled to their favors. To the extent that definitional equivalence secures the relationship between gifts and entitlements, the practice of gift giving gives little basis for understanding why Sarah is entitled to keep her place on the boat. After all, justifying the preferential consideration of Sarah’s interests is a substantive moral project not resolvable by appealing to the way we use language. Making the point metaphysically, we can say that it is in the nature of gift giving that the recipient of the gift is entitled to it, where the nature of the practice is socially constructed. We have, then, a fine example of how one can legitimately claim to own something despite the fact that he did nothing to merit or deserve it. The mistake is to think that this suffices as a basis to understand why Sarah, by virtue of already being on the boat, is entitled to have her favorable position protected. Sarah’s circumstance is one of moral luck in the extreme and we have yet to quell the skeptic’s challenge that morality is ill-suited to condemn Ida’s attempt to usurp her position on the boat.

Perhaps we can employ a contractualist fairy tale as a heuristic. Suppose that all possible essences are notified by God that He will randomly instantiate some of them. The others will forever remain merely possible beings. All the essences prefer exemplification to their merely possible state of existence. Being reasonable, all the essences agree; they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. Although a fair process, there is no pretext that the instantiated essences merit their exalted status. Still, everyone agreed to it and so, in effect, all signed off on the deal. If left uninstantiated, there is no basis for objection and it would be wrong of them—if they could—to instantiate themselves at
the expense of one of the exemplified essences. Applying this tale to Sarah, we have a means of understanding why her interests are granted preferential consideration without reference to appeals to either loyalty or solidarity.

VI

These neo-speciesist attempts fail; appeals to loyalty and solidarity relationships that (supposedly) hold only among our own members do not justify favoring human interests over the like interests of nonhuman animals. There are other options open to the neo-speciesist that have here been left untouched but I see little hope of their success.18 Unless and until we can produce powerful reasons for considering human interests as having much greater claim on us than the interest of other species, it is best we stop what we are doing. Our immorality is the least of the problems; the unimaginable and unwarranted pain and suffering in factory farms, animal laboratories, and hunting fields is of more immediate concern.

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Notes

1 This is a simplification. In theory, speciesists can allow for degrees of humanity where interests are weighted on a continuum. They may also allow for degrees of humanity but treat this attribute as a “range property” where interests of all individuals with any degree of humanity are counted equally. Speciesists may also think of “being human” as indeterminate and have varied resultant views regarding the relative weights of human interests.


3 We need to avoid verbal disputes here. Loyalists may protest that they are acting impartially, in that when they give all the morally relevant features of the situation their due, the right act is saving one’s friend. This mode of presentation suggests a normative rendering of “preferentially considering” the interests of an individual, that is, to preferentially consider one’s interests is to violate morality. I am using “preferentially considering” one’s interests descriptively, that is, it is an open question whether the preferential consideration of persons’ interests conforms to morality.

4 This definition is given by Jennifer Welchman in “Xenografting, Species Loyalty, and Human Solidarity,” Journal of Social Philosophy 34, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 246.

5 My skepticism concerns the true source of our generosity. Even those who are not motivated by self-aggrandizement are likely moved by the very laudable desire to mitigate pain and suffering. Of course, reduction of suffering adds to the species flourishing, but the motives should be kept distinct; we need only remind ourselves of the millions of Americans who donate time and money to nonhuman charitable organizations, not so much from concerns of species extinction, but because they want to see the most vulnerable and defenseless of creatures made better off.

6 I discuss this in greater detail in “Speciesism and Loyalty,” Behavior and Philosophy 19, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1991): 50ff.

My lifeboat cases are obviously underdescribed and decontextualized, and we owe feminist philosophy a debt for emphasizing how such abstraction can obscure moral assessments. Still, I believe that the general point of the examples can be gleaned.

Welchman, “Xenografting, Species Loyalty, and Human Solidarity,” 248, her emphasis.

For an excellent discussion of how readily we conflate psychological issues of what we can ask others to do with moral issues of what persons ought to do, see Richard Double, “Morality, Impartiality, and What We Can Ask of Persons,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 36, no. 2 (April 1999): 149–58.

Welchman, “Xenografting, Species Loyalty, and Human Solidarity,” 250.

I take these characters from Welchman, “Xenografting, Species Loyalty, and Human Solidarity,” 250ff.

“But surely the fact that Ida can live only if Jan kills Sarah is relevant; certainly, the killing/letting die distinction is relevant here.” The quickest way with this complaint is to make Ida sufficiently strong to overpower Sarah if she reaches the boat. In this case the only way to keep Sarah on the boat is to kill Ida. Now Ida can live only if Jan kills Sarah and Sarah can live only if Jan kills Ida.


Lotteries can be seen as random gift-giving devices. We think of the winner as entitled to his winnings although she done has nothing more to deserve it than any other of the gamblers.

Webster’s New Collegiate dictionary speaks of a gift certificate as “entitling the recipient to select merchandise . . .” (my emphasis).

I discuss other neo-speciesist ploys in “Moral Relevance and Marginal Cases” and Without A Tear (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004). An anonymous referee suggests that an appeal to reciprocity may ground a moderate speciesism: since it is wrong for humans to eat other humans but not wrong for animals to eat humans, humans owe special consideration to the interests of their own species. One might be suspicious of this reasoning since it would seem to imply that adult humans should preferentially consider the interests of other adults over the interests of (human) infants. In the end, I think, these type of reciprocity arguments are very much of a piece with solidarity arguments; they both suggest that we have special moral obligations to those who have the power to help us.