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Philosopher’s Index  http://philindex.org  selected search with subject: Moral Realism / Normativity and Realism /  special focus Street, Sharon (2016.04.27)

Brandhorst, Mario 2015. Der neue normative Realismus: einige kritische Fragen. Zeitschrift für philosophische Literatur, 69 (3): 275-305.

Copp, David 2015. Explaining Normativity. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 89: 48-73. "I contend that only a reductive form of naturalistic normative realism can offer a philosophically satisfying compatibilist answer."

Evers, Daan 2015. Street on Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons. Synthese 192 (11): 3663-3676.

Harman, Gilbert. 2015. Moral Relativism Is Moral Realism. Philosophical Studies, 172 (4): 855-863.

Talbott, William J. 2015. How Could a 'Blind' Evolutionary Process Have Made Human Moral Beliefs Sensitive to Strongly Universal, Objective Moral Standards? Biology and Philosophy 30 (5): 691-708.

Vavova, Katia. 2015. Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism. Philosophy Compass 10 (2): 104-116.

Cuneo, Terence / Shafer-Landau, Russ 2014. The Moral Fixed Points: New Directions for Moral Nonnaturalism. Philosophical Studies 171 (3): 399-443.

Tropman, Elizabeth. 2014. Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Moral Realism, Constructivism, and Explaining Moral Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 17 (2): 126-140.

Tropman, Elizabeth. 2014. Why Cornell Moral Realism Cannot Provide an Adequate Account of Moral Knowledge. Theoria 80 (2): 184-190.

De Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna / Singer, Peter 2012. The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason. Ethics 123 (1): 9-31.

Skarsaune, Knut Olav 2011. Darwin and Moral Realism: Survival of the Iffiest. Philosophical Studies 152 (2): 229-243. Doctoral dissertation: Essays in Moral Platonism!!

Street, Sharon 2011. Mind-Independence without the Mystery: Why Quasi-realists Can't Have It Both Ways. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6: 1-32. Quasi-realism about normativity is an ambitious attempt to have one's cake and eat it too in metaethics. The cake in question is an uncompromising naturalism that disavows anything metaphysically or epistemologically mysterious.

Gibbard, Allan. 2011. How Much Realism? Evolved Thinkers and Normative Concepts. Oxford Studies in Metaethics (annual series) 6: 33-51.

 

Street, Sharon 2010. What Is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics? Philosophy Compass 5 (5): 363-384.

Wielenberg, Erik J. 2010. On the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality. Ethics, 120 (3): 441-464 (Wielenberg, E. - Member of Christian Philosopher Society).

Skarsaune, Knut Olav 2011. Darwin and Moral Realism: Survival of the Iffiest. Philosophical Studies 152 (2): 229-243. (Doctoral dissertation: Essays in Moral Platonism)

Street, Sharon. 2009. Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Supplementary 35: 213-248.

Street, Sharon 2009. In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally Coherent Eccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters. Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues 19: 273-298.

Copp, David 2008. Darwinian Skepticism about Moral Realism. Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues 18: 186-206.

Street, Sharon 2008. Reply to Copp: Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism Worth Worrying About. Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues 18: 207-22.

Street, Sharon 2006. A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value. Philosophical Studies 127 (1): 109-166. (58 pages).

Dancy, Jonathan / Hookway, Christopher. 1986. Two conceptions of moral realism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 60: 167-187+184-205.

 

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